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Abstract 
Following the British decolonization process, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) 
continued as the final appellate court for many new states. Originally designed as a colonial court, the 
JCPC, therefore, continues to influence independent states. This testifies to the persistence of British 
colonial influence in the jurisprudence of former colonies. This research on the JCPC provides 
evidence colonial influences persist beyond the ceremonial and examines the Gambia and New 
Zealand as cases illustrating different paths to shedding this colonial institutional. 
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1. Introduction  
From 1947 through the mid-1980s, new states emerged onto the world stage. Following the end of 
British and other European imperial rule, independence was celebrated across Africa, the Pacific, and 
the Caribbean. Former dependent colonies took their places a sovereign states, standing alongside 
members of the United Nations and various regional groupings. The change was dramatic: In 1947 the 
United Nations included 57 independent states, by 1970th is had grown to 127, and by 1985 there were 
159 member countries (United Nations, n.d.). 
Although independent, not every state immediately severed all institutional ties with their former 
colonial power. This paper posits that the persistence of one particular British colonial institution, the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC), was more than ceremonial, informal, or due to the 
fact a particular nation continued to be a member of the British Commonwealth. Instead, it argues that 
vestiges of British colonial rule persisted as states harnessed colonial institutions they decided could be 
of value as they charted the way forward, whether for a few years, or continuing today. This study 
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examine the retention of the JCPC as the final court of appeal, against decisions of the domestic courts 
in individual jurisdictions. Case studies of New Zealand and The Gambia show both the strength of this 
imperial tie, and the varying paths taken to replace eventually replace the JCPC with a domestic court 
of final appeal.  
The JCPC is not just an historical aspect of the British Empire; its influence continues in the current 
[British] Common wealth of Nations. Its respected position in the former colonies is captured by 
Justice Michael Kirby (2008) of Australia: 
First, there was the realistic appreciation that the same personalities substantially 
constituted both their Lordships’ House and the Privy Council… Secondly, the habits of 
Empire inculcated in Australian lawyers a high measure of respect for just about 
everything that came from the Imperial capital. Not least in the pronouncements of law 
which was the glue that helped to bind the Empire together. Thirdly, traditions long 
observed, and utility derived from linkage to one of the great legal systems of the world as 
well as the high standards of reasoning typical of the House of Lords, helped maintain the 
impact of its influence long after the Imperial tide had receded (para. 7). 
As of 2018, 16 states still retained Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State (Note 1). While this largely 
ceremonial link with the former colonial power is enshrined in their constitutions, of far more 
consequence, however, are where the JCPC continues as the final court of appeal for independent states. 
Of the fifty former colonies, 30 (66 percent) retained the JCPC at Independence. Despite the 
adjudicative quality and reputation of the JCPC, the decision to retain such a powerful colonial vestige 
may seem counterintuitive, yet these decisions provide a powerful reminder of the persistence of 
British colonial influence long after independence. Two case studies exemplify the important role the 
decisions JCPC plays in the legal and political life of the states. New Zealand and Gambia are 
examples of states that abandoned appeals to the JCPC based on the collision of political considerations 
and the JCPC. New Zealand was free to abandon the JCPC with the Westminster Act of 1931, but the 
JCPC remained until 2005. The Gambia gained in dependence in 1964 and retained the JCPC until 
1996. These cases studies explicate the diverse circumstances under which each country finally severed 
this significant tie with the British Empire. 
 
2. The British Empire 
By 1740’s, the British Empire comprised a mere few islands in the Caribbean, the eastern seaboard 
colonies of North America, the rim of Hudson Bay and Nova Scotia, and a few trading posts on the 
west coasts of Africa and India. By 1914 (even with the loss of the 13 North American colonies in 
1976), it encompassed twenty-five percent of the world. This reflects the effective replication of British 
administrative and legal institutions as the empire expanded. As legal challenges percolate up the 
hierarchy, the judicial legitimization of legal policies is an important issue (Dahl, 1957). However, this 
reliance by independent states on such a colonial institution is fundamentally incompatible with the 
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modern notion of sovereignty (Swinfen, 1987).  
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) 
The JCPC is the apex of the colonial judicial hierarchy. It was an important part of the expansion and 
entrenchment of British colonial rule, lending legitimacy to the policies of the colonizers, or what Dahl 
(1957) describes as the lawmaking majority. It is itself, therefore, a national policy maker. Shapiro 
(1964) refers to this notion as political jurisprudence.  
It is important to understand the continued significance of the JCPC as part of the Privy Council, which 
is a large advisory body that advises the British monarch. Drawing its members from the Privy Council, 
the JCPC performs a substantive legal function and derives its jurisdiction from a custom based on the 
medieval Curia Regis (the King’s Court) or councilors to the king. The JCPC’s appellate jurisdiction 
rests on the theory that the monarch is the ultimate source and distributor of justice. By 1660, however, 
this power only extended to overseas territories under British rule (Burns, 1984), but included civil and 
criminal appeals. 
The modern JCPC emerged with the Judicial Committee Act of 1833. The legislation formalized its 
important structural features and practices (Howell, 1979). The Judicial Committee Act of 1844 
expanded the access of British subjects from all overseas territories (The National Archives, n.d.) by 
granting appeals without leave from a colony’s court of appeal. Under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 
1876 the Law Lords became the permanent judges of the court (The National Archives, n.d.). Currently, 
the thirteen Law Lords in London sit in panels of five or seven. The United Kingdom staffs and funds 
the JCPC entirely. Today, there is little doubt about the judicial nature of the JCPC (Burns, 1984). 
Herbert Bentwich (1856-1932), a British barrister and law commentator put it this way: “[T]he King, 
the Navy and the Judicial Committee are three solid and apparent bonds of the Empire; for the rest, the 
union depends on sentiment” (Pramdas, 1996, p. 15). Its mot to Honi Soit Mal Y Pense) or “shame on 
him who thinks ill of it” (Privy Council, n.d.) encapsulates the reputation and the lofty position of the 
court. 
The legal contributions of the JCPC are broad and important with fundamental principles adjudicated. 
Examples of this diversity include constitutional challenges to the death penalty, libel cases involving 
politicians, eminent domain, habeas corpus and issues involving provincial versus federal power. 
Furthermore, the JCPC (2019) touts appeals from jurisdictions with diverse legal histories and systems. 
Between 1858 and 1957, the JCPC handed down approximately 3,750 decisions for India alone.  
With the start of decolonization in 1931, the JCPC continued to play a role in states which retain the 
JCPC as the final appellate court. With a peak of 119 cases in 1931, the JCPC adjudicated an average 
of 52 appeals per year from 1932 to 2014. The number of cases, the diversity and its rich history, 
contribute to the positive reputation, and the continuing role and influence of the JCPC in the common 
law legal system in the British Commonwealth. While colonies had no choice in the establishment of 
the JCPC as their final appellate court, newly independent states did have this as an option, and could 
sever ties at independence. 
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Decolonization and the Persistence of the JCPC 
In 1858, Oxford University professor Goldwin Smith called for colonial emancipation and a severing 
of all constitutional ties between the U.K. and her colonies (Howell, 1979), but the legal and political 
communities in the U.K. and the colonies derided Smith’s assertion. This early call, however, 
foreshadowed the process of decolonization that unfolded gradually after 1900. Although five colonies 
gained dominion status within the Empire soon after 1900, it was not until 1931 that these five 
dominions—Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and South Africa—established themselves as 
sovereign states in the international community. It is noteworthy that only Ireland, having fought for 
independence (Dorney, 2012), opted to replace the JCPC in 1931.  
This process of decolonization accelerated after World War II. Starting with India in 1947, 
independence was gained by Pakistan, Myanmar (Burma), Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Ghana, Nigeria, Sudan, 
and Malaysia. By 1963, Cyprus and nine other African states were also independent (Watts, 2010). In 
the Caribbean, Jamaica was first in 1962, followed by eleven other states. Yet, the common law legal 
system persists and, in many cases, does so with little fundamental change. The JCPC continued to play 
a role in judicial policy-making in many small states such as in the Caribbean, and in large and 
populous states such as Malaysia and Sri Lanka in Asia, The Gambia in Africa, and some Pacific 
states.The situation is very mixed. For example, New Zealand and Sri Lanka severed ties with the 
JCPC, 95 and 24 years respectively, after independence. Others, such as Jamaica and St. Lucia have 
kept ties with the JCPC (as of January 2020). Today, only 14 British Overseas Territories (Note 2) 
comprise the remainder of the British Empire. The British Common wealth has 53 member states from 
Africa, Asia, the Americas, Europe, and the Pacific regions (Note 3). 
A preliminary review provides more insight into the relationship between a sample of 50 states from 
the British Common wealth (Note 4) and the JCPC. A comparative analysis reveals that states fall into 
three distinct groups (see Table 1). Group 1 is comprised of the 20 former colonies (40 percent) that 
abolished all appeals to the JCPC upon independence. In Group 2 are the 17 states (34 percent) that 
retained the right of appeal for a period after independence before abolishing access to the JCPC. 
Group 3 consists of the 12 former colonies (24 percent) which as of January 1, 2016 still retain the 
JCPC as the final appellate court. These differences point to competing approaches in governance and 
policymaking by sovereign states, and how states view this extraterritorial court as a partner in 
policymaking and their approach to state sovereignty. 
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Table 1. Status of the JCPC in Each State at Independence 
Group Relationship with JCPC States 
1 Abolished appeals to JCPC at 
Independence (20 states) 
Botswana, Cyprus, Ireland, Rep. of, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Myanmar, Nauru, 
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Tonga, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
2 Retained appeals to JCPC for a 
period before severing (18 
states) 
Australia, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Dominica, 
Guyana, Fiji, India, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Singapore, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Uganda  
3 Retain appeals to JCPC (12 
states) 
Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Brunei, Grenada, 
Jamaica, Kiribati, Mauritius, St. Lucia, St. Kitts 
& Nevis, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad 
& Tobago, Tuvalu  
Note. Data for relationship of the states with the JCPC from Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
(2019), and from Encyclopedia Britannica (2020). 
 
As states emerged from colonial rule, there was a decrease in the number of states served by the JCPC 
and a decrease in the number of cases adjudicated (see Figure 1). The number of cases includes the 
states, colonies, and territories that continue to retain the JCPC as of January 1, 2015. The steep drop in 
the annual number of cases from 119 in 1931 to 34 in 1950 can be explained by the fact that Canada 
and India abolished appeals to the JCPC in 1948 and 1950, respectively. After that time, despite the 
gradual decline in the number of countries from 48 in 1955 to 12 in 2015, the number of cases per 
annum increased from 39 in 1955 to 43 cases in 2014, illustrating a continued reliance on the JCPC. 
Based on my review of JCPC cases, an uptick in appeals in death penalty cases from the 
Commonwealth Caribbean explains the high point in 1995 with 61 cases. Despite the gradual decline in 
the number of states, those that continue to use the JCPC do so more frequently. This speaks to the 
reputation of the JCPC and the reliance the states have on this extraterritorial court, despite any 
apparent contradiction with the ideals of sovereignty.  
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Figure 1. The Number of JCPC Cases from 1931 to 2015 and the Number of States 
Note. Data is drawn from British and Irish Legal Information Institute’s database (2020). 
 
Case Studies 
Yin (2003) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident” (13). Collier (2010) states that this process can further evaluate the hypotheses and 
deepen our understanding of the phenomenon not possible with the quantitative analyses. For our 
purposes, case studies of New Zealand and The Gambia present two distinct sequence of events 
culminating in the replacement of the JCPC with a domestic court of final appeal. Using causal-process 
observations, I conduct a within-case comparison on each state leading to replacing the JCPC. Each 
study provides insight into the importance of the legal link and how national governments view this 
potential legal check on domestic matters and sovereignty.  
 
3. New Zealand 
Although both The Gambia and New Zealand eventually abolished appeals to the JCPC, the political 
environment at the time was much more nuanced in New Zealand than in The Gambia where this 
change followed years of authoritarian rule. Nevertheless, replacing the JCPC in New Zealand was no 
less driven by the will of the governing coalition in a changed political environment. The Westminster 
Act (1931) gives all Dominions the option of replacing the JCPC, but as Wilson (2010) points out, this 
act was not even adopted by the New Zealand parliament until 1947 (Statute of Westminster Adoption 
Act), and the status quo was never seriously challenged until after World War II.  
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Sir Robert Stout (Former Chief Justice in New Zealand), called for the abolition of appeals in 1908 
(Cornes, 2015), and serious debates about abolishing the JCPC took place at four junctures after the 
Westminster Act of 1931. In the 1940s, Chief Justice Sir Michael Myers presented a cabinet report 
focusing on the establishment of “a Commonwealth Court of Appeal” (Wilson, 2010, p. 12). This idea 
was raised by then Attorney General Hanan in 1965 at the Third Commonwealth and Empire Law 
Conference in Sydney, Australia, but it lacked political support in New Zealand (Wilson, 2010). In 
1987, the Labor Party government (1984-1990) announced a proposal to abolish the JCPC at the New 
Zealand Law Conference. The decision to drop the proposal was partly influenced by Databank 
Systems Ltd v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (1990) and Petrocorp Exploration Ltd v. Minister of 
Energy (1991) in which the JCPC upheld the state’s regulatory power over financial services and 
natural resources respectively (Richardson, 1997).  
In 1996, The National Party introduced a bill to replace the JCPC. The general elections later in 1996 
forced the National Party into a coalition government with the New Zealand First Party which opposed 
the abolition of appeals to the JCPC (Courts of New Zealand, n.d.; Wilson, 2010). Richardson (1997) 
concludes that this effort was also partially derailed by the JCPC’s decision favoring the government’s 
regulatory authority over fishing rights in Treaty Tribes Coalition v. Urban Maori Authorities & the 
Attorney General of New Zealand (1997).  
The next section traces how the successful attempt unfolds and points to the causal elements 
underpinning the replacing of JCPC with the Supreme Court of New Zealand in 2004. Further, it 
discusses changes in the political environment, the debate about the structural relationship between 
parliamentary sovereignty and the power of judicial review, the role of JCPC decisions, and the 
influence of the governing elite and the public.  
Although not as extreme as the changes in The Gambian regime after the 1994 coup d’état, there were 
alterations in New Zealand’s political environment in 1999. Freedom House reports consistently high 
scores for political freedom and civil liberties and the country always maintained its status as “free” 
(Freedom House, 2014a; Freedom House, 2014b), but there were clear ideological shifts in New 
Zealand at that time. These influenced the deliberate steps taken by the governing coalition aimed at 
replacing the JCPC. The Labour Party that won the general elections in 1999 (Electoral Commission of 
New Zealand 2015) claimed the “center-left of the political spectrum” (Markey, 2008, p. 87); while the 
Labour Party had a history of liberalism, relying on support from the working class and was more 
inclined to view government as having an important role to play in the society (Markey, 2008), the 
party’s manifest to explicitly included a pledge to abolish appeals to the JCPC. Furthermore, the Labor 
Party formed the government with the Alliance Party, which was also ideologically left-leaning (Pierce, 
1999) and supported replacing the JCPC. On taking office, Prime Minister Clark and her cabinet were 
very purposeful in the handling of this issue, trying to ensure that those who raised objections during 
previous attempts were heard. The cabinet had “extensive consultation with Maori, the legal profession 
and the business community before it committed to the policy” (Wilson, 2010, p. 17). This set the stage 
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for the public debate with the December 2000 release of “Discussion Paper: Reshaping New Zealand’s 
Appeal Structure” (Wilson, 2000), produced by the Office of the Attorney General in close consultation 
with the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Justice, and Minister of Maori Affairs. 
The Discussion Paper (Wilson, 2000) provides five official rationales for pursing this constitutional 
change as follows:  
• “National identity and independence” (1) 
• “Many Commonwealth countries have abolished appeals to the Privy Council” (2) 
• “Few New Zealand cases are heard by the Privy Council” (2) 
• “New Zealand’s changing international relationships” (2) 
• “Cost and accessibility” (3) 
Margaret Wilson was the Attorney General (1999-2005); in a lecture at Inner Temple in London, 
Wilson (2010) expounded on the rationale of the new governing coalition government for pursuing the 
abolition of appeals to the JCPC. Using Wilson’s lecture notes along with other sources, this section 
examines the official rationales in the Discussion Paper, focusing on constitutional change to replace 
the JCPC. Wilson (2010) makes it abundantly clear that “while abolition of appeals to the Privy 
Council [JCPC] was part of New Zealand’s development towards real independence, it was not the 
primary motive for the initiative” (28). Other issues such as the costs of accessing JCPC and the small 
number of cases with limited value as precedent for New Zealand are addressed by Wilson but seem 
not to be the primary focus.  
The assertion is that there are three interconnected reasons underpinning the governing coalition’s 
initiative to replace the JCPC with a domestic final appellate court. First, the Labour Partyin 1999 
espoused a new vision for New Zealand as an independent state and its role in the world community. 
This included revisiting of the neo-liberal economic policies championed by the more conservative 
National Party government (Wilson, 2010). Charting a new path required harnessing the governing 
institutions, including the judiciary, to effectively develop and implement policies that advance the new 
economic and political agenda. Wilson (2010), therefore, reflects on the governing coalition’s view that 
the JCPC was not the appropriate venue to support the new vision. In fact, the JCPC was viewed as 
having a limited role in producing necessary precedents for the following reasons: (1) few cases were 
actually going to the JCPC; (2) there was a decline in the number of countries that use the JCPC (while 
Wilson makes no direct reference to other countries having abolished appeals to the JCPC, it should be 
noted that New Zealand’s Asian-Pacific neighbors Australia and Fiji abolished appeals in 1986 and 
1988, respectively); (3) statutory limitations on the JCPC’s jurisdiction in important areas such as 
workers’ rights and environmental issues limited its utility as an ally; and (4) the influence of legal 
developments in the U.K. on the JCPC was deemed inappropriate for New Zealand. This last point is 
particularly significant and is exemplified in the New Zealand Court of Appeal case, R v Hansen 
(2007), which refers to and interprets the U.K. Human Rights Act of 1998. In the Hansen decision, 
Justice Tipping states, “whether [such an approach] is appropriate in England is not for me to say, but I 
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am satisfied that it is not appropriate in New Zealand” (as cited by Wilson, 2010, p. 8). 
Second, as the Labour Party took control, there needed to be a re-examination of the vision for the state 
and the citizens. The prevailing view was that this issue was best handled by “the New Zealand 
community and by judges familiar with that community and responsible for the maintenance of the rule 
of law” (Wilson, 2010, p. 24). The new vision focused on the relationship between parliamentary 
sovereignty and the power of judicial review of the policies of the elected governing coalition. The 
governing coalition’s view was that New Zealand’s domestic and international realities had changed 
and placed on “...both parliament and the courts new responsibilities... in a relationship better described 
as a ‘collaborative enterprise’... rather the traditional command model…” (6).  
The Wilson (2000) arguments are reminiscent of those put forward by Hogg and Bushell (2007) in 
addressing this issue in Canada. They describe the relationship between the courts and the legislature as 
a “dialogue” (79). Without explicitly pointing a finger at the JCPC as being an unsuitable partner in 
New Zealand’s “collaborative enterprise”, Wilson (2010) states that “appeals to the Privy Council 
[JCPC] seemed increasingly anomalous” (16). Further, she cites examples going back to 1904 where 
then-Chief Justice of New Zealand Robert Stout notes, “At present we in New Zealand are, so far as the 
Privy Council is concerned, in an unfortunate position. It has shown that it knows not our statutes, our 
conveyancing terms, or our history” (as cited by Wilson, 2010, p. 11). 
Finally, it is worth examining a sample of decisions of the JCPC on cases originating in New Zealand 
in which the state is a party. Wilson (2010) indicates no displeasure with any decision or the history of 
decision-making by the JCPC. Nevertheless, two points need to be made. First, in referring to examples 
of decisions of the New Zealand Court of Appeals, Wilson (2010) states categorically that each 
domestic appellate court decision “accurately reflects the constitutional reality within which the 
relationship between the courts, the executive and the parliament work” (8). In other words, the judges 
appointed by the governing coalition should understand New Zealand and its realities. The implication 
is the domestic final appellate court, staffed with judges from New Zealand; would ipso facto be 
advantageous for New Zealand. Edwards (2001) suggests that the domestic courts had been performing 
better over time. Arguably, this is reflected in the decisions: between 1990 and 1994, the JCPC allowed 
17 of 33 appeals from New Zealand. That dropped to 11 of 48 between 1995 and 1999 which is the 
period preceding the Attorney General’s position paper (Wilson, 2000) on severing ties with the JCPC 
(Edwards, 2001).  
Second, the data on the level of success in cases from New Zealand where the state is a party may 
provide some insight. From 1990 to 1998, the JCPC decisions favor the state in 80 percent of the cases. 
From 2000 to 2005, JCPC decisions favor the state in 57 percent of the cases, which is a 23 percent 
drop from the preceding period. From 1990 to 1998 (the year before the general elections won by the 
Labour Party), there were 25 cases where the state was the respondent. Significantly, the JCPC 
decisions favor the state in 90 percent of the cases. From 1999 to 2005, JCPC there were 40 cases 
where the state was the respondent. The decisions favor the state in 61 percent of the cases, which 
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represents a 27 percent drop from the preceding period. This comparison of state success before the 
JCPC is presented in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of Success Rates for All Cases in Which the State Is a Party and Cases 
Where the State Is the Respondent in Favor of the State between 1990 and 2005 
 
Even taking into consideration that there was lag time between when the petition was filed and when 
the case decision was handed down by the JCPC, the difference between the two periods compared is 
stark and may be indicative of a growing disconnection between the new governing coalition’s vision 
for New Zealand and the JCPC.  
While the governing coalition parties were united in favor of abolishing appeals, the opposition parties 
were equally opposed. The National, New Zealand First, ACT New Zealand, and United Future Parties 
all voted against the bill. Besides the opposition parties, there were other opposing voices to the 
proposal to abolish the JCPC. These voices were predominantly from the legal and business 
communities, though there was no majority consensus for or against the proposed change (Justice and 
Electoral Committee Report, 2003). As most of the cases from New Zealand that reached the JCPC 
were commercial disputes, those that opposed the abolition stressed that it would negatively affect the 
confidence of large companies and international investors in New Zealand (Story, 2001). The editor of 
the New Zealand Law Journal, Bernard Robertson was one such opponent who felt that the JCPC 
contributed to “good political policy”, and a change was politically short-sighted (cited in Story, 2001, 
p. 22). John Hagan, Chairman of Deloitte Touché Tohmatsu, spoke on behalf of his and four other 
accounting firms. He asserts that commercial interests would be subject to a biased and less competent 
domestic court. Finally, Robert Kerr, Chairman of the New Zealand Business Round Table, reiterated 
confidence in the JCPC, particularly regarding commercial cases, and expressed skepticism about the 
Attorney General’s process of consultation about its domestic replacement (Story, 2001).  
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What did the public think about the proposal to abolish appeals to the JCPC? The Discussion Paper 
(Wilson, 2000) released by the Office of the Attorney General presenting the position of the governing 
coalition provided for a three-month period of public discussion and written submissions following its 
release. The Attorney General also continued consultations with Maori leaders, the business 
community, and the legal profession. When the period for public comment ended on March 30, 2001, 
only 70 submissions had been received, and they were evenly split between support for and rejection of 
the proposal. (Wilson, 2010). Another period for public comment followed the first reading of the bill 
in Parliament on December 9, 2002. Wilson (2010; see also the Justice and Electoral Committee Report 
2003) reports that the 312 written submissions received were again evenly split between those 
supporting abolition and those favoring retention of the JCPC, while “the majority of oral submissions 
supported retention” of the JCPC (21). With a population of four million in 2003 (Statistics New 
Zealand 2011), this level of response from New Zealanders was low by any measure. A petition, 
initiated by Attorney Dennis Gates with support from the opposition parties (National Party and ACT 
New Zealand), put the question of abolishing the JCPC to a referendum that also reflected the low level 
of public interest. This was opposed by the governing coalition partners (Labour Party and New 
Zealand First Party). The petition failed to gather the 310,000 signatures required by law (Archive. is 
2012; Justice and Electoral Committee Report 2003). Further, a 2003 public opinion poll found that 51 
percent favored the Supreme Court Bill replacing the JCPC, but 40 percent knew nothing about the 
matter (UMR Research 2003). 
With a solid majority in parliament (Markey, 2008; Electoral Commission of New Zealand 2015), the 
governing coalition moved forward and prevailed. The Supreme Court Bill introduced in 2002 was 
passed after the third and final reading in Parliament on October 14, 2003. It came into force on 
January 1, 2004, and officially abolished any possibility of appeal to the JCPC for all decisions of New 
Zealand courts made after December 31, 2003. It also established the New Zealand Supreme Court as 
the final appellate court, which began hearing appeals on July 1, 2004 (Courts of New Zealand, n.d.). 
Ultimately, the change in environment, beginning with the 1999 general elections victory of the Labour 
Party revealed a different vision for New Zealand that was deemed incompatible with a continued role 
for the JCPC. The new coalition government, led by the Labour Party and with the support of the 
Alliance Party and the Green Party, did not believe that their new domestic and international vision for 
New Zealand could be realized with the JCPC as a policy-making partner. While the governing 
coalition did invite public participation, it was obvious that the passing of the Supreme Court Act of 
2003 was primarily driven by the political leadership. Wilson (2010) confirms this based on the 
public’s low levels of response: “it was obvious this was not an issue that attracted a great deal of 
public concern and what concern that was expressed was amongst the elites” (18). 
Tracing the change in the political environment, the specified goals, and the deliberate process of the 
governing coalition in imposing its will, supports my theory that a governing coalition expects a final 
appellate court to be a reliable partner in the process of producing and upholding public policy. In New 
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Zealand, the changed political environment is not captured on the democratic-authoritarian continuum 
operationalized using Freedom House or the Center for Systemic Peace (Polity IV) data. There was, 
however, an ideological change in the approach of the governing coalition representative which shifted 
the status quo. This influenced the governing coalition to deem the JCPC as not the best, or most 
appropriate, partner for implementing their new vision for New Zealand. Margret Wilson, Attorney 
General from 2000 to 2005, was a primary collaborator with other leaders of the governing coalition 
that produced the Discussion Paper (2000) that publicly presented the rationales for abolishing appeals 
to the JCPC. It seems improbable that Wilson would have been unaware of the increasingly 
unfavorable decisions being handed down by the JCPC. This assertion is supported by Wilson’s 
statement in 2010 that “appeals to the Privy Council [JCPC] seemed increasingly anomalous” (Wilson, 
2010, p. 16). In other words, the right of appeal to the JCPC had become incongruous or inconsistent 
with the new vision for New Zealand. Even more telling was her repetition of the Robert Stout’s 1907 
comment of the JCPC’s lack of knowledge about the laws, practices, and history of New Zealand (as 
cited by Wilson, 2010, p. 11).  
By establishing the New Zealand Supreme Court, the governing coalition brought this final appellate 
court within the administrative control of the governing coalition. Unlike with the JCPC, the governing 
coalition could control all important administrative aspects including judicial appointments, terms of 
service, and fiscal allocations for the highest appellate court. The changed political environment with 
the results of the 1999 general elections was enough to effectively forge a change to an important 
institution in the judiciary. This shift in the political climate was not as drastic as that ushered in by the 
1994 coup d’état in The Gambia. The constitutional change in both states, however, was driven by the 
will of the governing coalition influenced by the political climate and the perception of the governing 
coalition that the JCPC was no longer a viable partner. The JCPC no longer served the purposes of the 
governing coalition, resulting in the need to establish a domestic final appellate court. The importance 
of the political will to effect change was summarized by the former President of the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal, Sir Thaddeus McCarthy. He stated in 1976 that he had no doubt that the questions 
surrounding severing ties with the JCPC “are ultimately political questions” (Richardson, 1997, p. 
915). 
 
4. The Gambia 
At independence in 1965, the Gambian constitutional system reflected the Westminster model. Dawda 
Kairaba Jawara (1965-1994) led the post-independence rule of the Peoples’ Progressive Party (PPP), in 
what is generally characterized as a period of stability with open elections and respect for civil rights 
and liberties (Perfect, 2010). The PPP won five consecutive elections with the only unconstitutional 
challenge being the failed coup d’état in 1981 (Country Watch 2019). To gauge the health of the 
Gambian democracy, the Freedom House scores (2019) of democracy are useful. This leading 
international organization monitors the political environment based on regime changes on a 
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democratic-authoritarian continuum. Freedom House scores are available starting 1972. States are rated 
in three categories as follows: 
• Respect for Human Rights: high to low (1-7) 
• Upholding of Civil Liberties: high to low (1-7) 
• Overall score (Freedom Score): Free, (1); Partially Free, (0); and Not Free (-1) 
The Gambia receives a favorable rating regarding political rights and civil liberties in 14 of the 21 
years reported. Figure 3 presents the scores in the three categories discussed above from 1972 to 1998, 
reflecting the dramatic decline starting in 1994. The Gambia is rated as “partially free” (“0”) from 1981 
to 1988, which coincides with the failed coup d’état in 1981 and the short-lived federation with Senegal 
from 1984 to 1989.  
 
 
Figure 3. Gambia’s Freedom House Scores from 1972 through 1998 (Freedom House 2014) 
 
Based on the preceding discussion, The Gambia enjoyed a consistent period of democratic rule after 
independence in 1965 through 1994. During that period, the state was a party in three cases, with a 
favorable JCPC decision in only one of the three. The state was the appellant in one of the three, and 
the decision was not in its favor. In the other two cases where the state was the respondent, it prevailed 
in one. There are several reasons for the small number of JCPC cases involving the state. First, the 
lower courts handed down decisions favorable to the governing coalition, thereby removing any need 
to appeal to the JCPC. Second, using the GDP per capita as a proxy for resource availability, the costs 
of accessing the JCPC is prohibitive, except in cases considered particularly important to litigants. The 
literature also discusses the high costs associated with accessing the JCPC (O’Conner & Bilder, 2012; 
Swinfen, 1987; Taylor, 2005). While the costs may be a deterrent for many litigants, if the state is 
dissatisfied with lower court decisions it is prepared to use resources to access the JCPC, as it perceives 
the court to be a reliable partner. Those conditions may have contributed to the status quo. Despite the 
costs, and regardless of the number of cases that it actually adjudicates, the states often perceive there 
to be a benefit to having this reputable extraterritorial court (Lange, 2004; Seow, 1997). This point is 
best exemplified by the statement of the first Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, to 
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parliament in 1967:  
As long as governments are wise enough to leave alone the rights of appeal to some superior body 
outside Singapore, then there must be a higher degree of confidence in the integrity of our judicial 
process. This is most important (cited in Seow 1997, para. 15). 
This was the case, in Attorney General of Gambia v. Momodou Jobe, adjudicated by the JCPC before 
the coup d’état in 1994. It was an appeal to the JCPC against a decision of the Gambian Court of 
Appeal that declared four provisions of the Special Criminal Court Act (1979) to be ultra vires, or in 
violation of the 1970 Constitution. The JCPC declared that only Section 8(5) was ultra vires. Section 
20(2) guaranteeing the fundamental right to the “presumption of innocence” until proven guilty and 
was, therefore, unconstitutional and void (Jammeh, 2011). Senghore (2010) notes that in the Momodou 
Jobe decision the JCPC effectively curbed the power of the legislature by declaring a section of the 
Special Criminal Court Act as unconstitutional: “This case [Jobe] represents a practical example of the 
functioning of the special criminal court on one hand and corrects the excesses of the legislature and 
executive on the other” (222). This challenge to the policies of the state was important enough for the 
state to use public resources to appeal the unfavorable decision of the lower court to the JCPC. The 
decision reinforced the constitutional rule of law, and the governing coalition did not perceive the 
decision to be a serious enough challenge to their legitimacy.  
At the time, however, the democratic political environment made the governing coalition less sensitive 
to the unfavorable section of decision. Those in power, therefore, are willing to have power partially 
curbed by the JCPC as the decision generally upheld the governing coalition’s policy for addressing 
crime reflected in the Special Criminal Court Act. This JCPC decision, despite failing to uphold the all 
sections of the Special Criminal Court Act, was not sufficient to move the state to abolish appeals to 
the JCPC in a political environment where the governing coalition of President Jawara and the PPP 
supported reasonably strong democratic institutions (Country Watch 2019). 
The second unfavorable decision to the governing coalition is Alhaji Malang Kanteh v The Attorney 
General and others (1975) which involved the sale of confiscated property by the police. The appellant 
claimed the property was on lease to another who was subject to a writ of fieri facias, or legal authority 
to seize property, to satisfy a judgment for another party. The value of the claim in 1975 was US$832, 
which is more than twice the GDP per capita. While this may be significant to the appellant, the 
decision did not undermine a policy of the governing coalition resulting in a negative perception of the 
JCPC. During this period after independence, therefore, the governing coalition did not perceive a 
serious disconnection with the JCPC and, at the same time, may have considered this credible 
extraterritorial court as part of the constitutional right of appeals and beneficial to the state and the 
Gambian legal system. 
The coup d’état ushered in two years (1994-1996) of military rule by the Armed Forces Provisional 
Ruling Council (AFPRC). The event transformed The Gambia from constitutional rule to rule by 
military decree (Jeng, 2013). This drastic change in the Gambian political environment is captured in 
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the Freedom House scores (2019) which rates The Gambia as “not free” (-1) from 1994 onward. After 
the coup, Amnesty International (1995) reports the change in governance by the AFPRC led by 
President Jammeh. Their 1995 report outlines a pattern of arbitrary arrests and detentions, restrictions 
on political activities, movement of leaders from the Jawara government and the PPP, and the 
harassment of journalists and owners of newspapers in an apparent effort to stifle criticism of the 
government. The AFPC transformed itself into a political party led by the coup d’état leader turned 
civilian president, Yahal Jammeh (Jammeh, 2011; Perfect, 2010; Wolf, 2019).  
The August 6, 1996, referendum returned The Gambia to constitutional rule as the Second Republic 
(Jeng, 2013) and its new Constitution replaced the JCPC with the Supreme Court of Gambia as the 
final appellate court. As a result, access to the domestic court became less expensive than accessing the 
JCPC in London. While President Jammeh and the governing AFPRC had been able to intimidate and 
attack opposition supporters and constrain the media (Perfect, 2010), a situation the 2015 Amnesty 
International Country Report (2015) describes as repressive legislation “further restricting freedom of 
expression and increasing punitive measures against journalists” (para. 1), Gambians, were also more 
than ready for return to constitutional rule (Senghore, 2010). 
The Gambia’s democratic freedom scores have declined dramatically since 1993 when Freedom House 
rated The Gambia as “Free” (1). From 1994 to 1998, The Gambia received a rating of “Not Free” for 
each year. The change in environment illustrates the authoritarian shift in the regime, which increased 
the sensitivity of the governing coalition to challenges—including potential challenges before the 
JCPC—over which the governing coalition had no control.  
In the absence of specific formal and recorded debate about the role of the JCPC, tracing the effects of 
specific decisions of the JCPC between the 1994 coup d’état and leading up the adoption of the new 
constitution in 1996 is instructive. The state is a party to one of the four JCPC appeals between 1994 
and 1998. In West Coast Air Limited v Gambia Civil Aviation Authority and Another (1998) damages 
were assessed against the state at US$500,000 for breach of contract. Considering the GDP per capita 
of about US$500, that assessment was a relatively large sum for breach of contract and probably 
enough to make the governing coalition resentful of the JCPC which overturned the lower domestic 
court of appeals. The low number of cases could reflect the lower court’s support for the policies of the 
governing coalition, which would limit the governing coalition’s need to rely on the JCPC. The results 
put a spotlight on the rare cases decided by the JCPC and highlight the potential risk of having 
challenges to policies adjudicated unfavorably by an exterritorial court.  
The governing coalition was, therefore, aware of the potential existed for unfavorable JCPC decisions. 
Conversely, the regime was aware that it had control over the domestic courts and their role as a 
potential important ally in its quest for legitimacy. This is exemplified by the case of Saihou Sanui 
Ceesay & Sons Limited V. AMRC (1994). The issue is the constitutionality Sections 18(1) and (2) of 
the Asset Management Recovery Corporation Act (AMRC) of 1993. Section 18 (1) declares that no 
injunction or other restraints could be issued against the Assets Evaluation Commission set up under 
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the AMRC, and Section 18 (2) declares The Gambia Court of Appeal to be the final court on any issue. 
One High Court bench, therefore, dismissed the appeal in Saihou Sanui Ceesay, Saihou Ceesay & Sons 
Limited (1994). As a result, the state’s actions are beyond review. In the High Court case of AMRC & 
Attorney General v. Saidou Sowe (1994) that challenged Section 18 (1), it was found to be partly 
constitutional but Section 18 (2) totally unconstitutional (reversing Saihou Sanui Ceesay & Sons 
Limited V. AMRC). Both decisions were handed down prior to the coup in July of that year, presenting 
conflicting decisions on the constitutionality of Sections 18(1) and (2) of the Asset Management 
Recovery Corporation Act (AMRC) of 1993. On appeal after the coup d’état, the Court of Appeals 
reaffirmed the constitutionality of both provisions (Jammeh, 2011). The state, therefore, is not subject 
to injunctive remedies but has the option to seek those remedies against others. Jammeh (2011) points 
out that this was a derogation of the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms enumerated in the 
1997 Constitution (Sections 17 through 33), including depravation of property (Constitution of The 
Republic of Gambia 1997).  
The decisions of the Court of Appeals after the 1994 coup d’état illustrate that while the domestic 
courts may function as reliable partners in the governing coalition by legitimizing its policies, the JCPC 
still remains the final possible legal veto point. The governing coalition is not willing to take the chance 
of having a favorable decision overturned by the JCPC.  
A reading of the 1996 constitution makes it clear that the governing coalition sought to constrain the 
jurisdiction of the judiciary and insulate itself from legal challenges to its policies and actions. 
Schedule 2 of the constitution includes Section 13 that ousts the jurisdiction of the courts about any 
actions or decisions of the AFPRC on the day of the coup d’état (July 2, 1994), following the 
suspension of the 1970 constitution and under the constitution of 1996. Further, the 1996 constitution 
provides for the establishment of the Supreme Court of Gambia within 18 months of the approval of 
the new constitution, with appeals continuing to go to the JCPC until that time. 
The case involving Lamin Waa Juwara is a much-publicized example of the effects of Section 13 and 
the power to replace the JCPC in the 1996 constitution. Juwara served as the Minister of Lands before 
the coup d’état and subsequently joined the opposition United Democratic Party. In 1996, he was 
arrested twice for banned political activities and held for 10 weeks. He was released in October 1996 
without being charged (Amnesty International 1996). Claiming human rights violations, Juwara filed a 
lawsuit against the government in July 1998, which was dismissed by the judge, citing Section 13 of 
the constitution which provides immunity from legal action to all members and representative of AFPC 
(Interparliamentary Union 2001). Both the Interparliamentary Union (2001) and Mass (2012) report 
that Juwara filed a petition to appeal to the JCPC. The governing coalition replaced the JCPC with the 
Supreme Court of Gambia in October 1998, before the petition before the JCPC could be considered 
(Senghore, 2010). This effectively ended the possibility of the petition going any further and any risk of 
the JCPC handing down a decision unfavorable to the governing coalition. Mass (2012) states, 
“Jammeh administration was determined to cover up its dirty linen… decided to change the Gambia’s 
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legal status. It rushed to establish the Supreme Court of the Gambia so the Gambians would not seek 
redress outside the country’s jurisdiction” (para.7). 
As a minister in the former governing coalition and a prominent opposition figure to the Jammeh 
regime (Amnesty International 1996), had the Jawara case had reached the JCPC, it was inevitable that 
his persecution would have been laid bare before the court. A favorable JCPC decision of Jawara 
would embarrass the regime and lend support to its critics and support the negative democracy scores 
by Freedom House (2019) that started in 1994.  
After ruling by decree for two years, the new constitution was approved through referendum and 
established the Second Republic in 1997. Replacing the JCPC with the Supreme Court of Gambia in 
October 1998 embodied the apparent desire of the Jammeh regime to control the judiciary. Section 138 
(1) of the 1996 Constitution provides for the appointment of a Chief Justice by the President after 
consultation with the Judicial Services Commission, and Section 138 (2) provides for the appointment 
of all other judges by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. 
Section 141 of the constitution stipulates age for retirement criteria for judges. Senghore (2010) points 
out, however, that the tenure of judges is directly threatened by s. 141(2) (c) of the Constitution which 
legalizes presidential termination of services in consultation with the Judicial Service Commission. 
This is an effective loophole for the president as the Commission is appointed by the president 
(Senghore, 2010). These powers of appointment and dismissal are not available to the governing 
coalition when the JCPC serves as the final appellate court. 
In a more democratic state, the governing coalition may be less reliant on the court for legitimacy. 
Furthermore, more democratic regimes may be less willing to pursue policies likely to be challenged in 
court. Authoritarian states lack the legitimacy of elections, making them more likely to want the 
approval of the courts (Moustafa, 2014; Solomon, 2007). Looking at the unfavorable decisions, the new 
governing coalition of The Gambia witnessed firsthand the power of the JCPC to undermine its policies. 
The small number of cases made each noteworthy and an easy focal point representing challenges to 
the governing coalition. Further, tracing the president’s use of the constitutional power to appoint and 
dismiss a sitting justice point to the conclusion that replacing the JCPC with a domestic final court of 
appeal is to extend the governing coalition’s control over the judiciary. The literature points to 
examples where the delivery of decisions unfavorable to the state is followed closely by the dismissal 
of a justice (e.g., Jammeh, 2010). Further, the examination of the governing coalition’s use of the 
judiciary and other governing institutions to suppress opposition activities is reflected in the assessment 
of political and civil liberties.  
It seems apparent that the governing coalition after 1994 did not view the JCPC as a viable partner. By 
establishing the Supreme Court of The Gambia, the governing coalition expected to gain a more 
reliable partner—one over which it had virtually unfettered constitutional control. This extension of 
control over the final appellate court had the effect of reducing the likelihood of successful legal 
challenges to the policies of the governing coalition. 
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5. Summary 
The JCPC was an important part of the expansion, consolidation, and governance of the British Empire. 
What makes the phenomenon of the persistence of the JCPC unique is the fact that the U.K. made the 
court available to former colonies, and some new states did accede to the JCPC upon independence, 
effectively outsourcing the final appellate court to the former colonial power—an apparent affront to 
the traditional understanding of state sovereignty (Brown, 2002). 
There is no denying the judicial experience, quality, and prestige attributed to the JCPC. In fact, the 
quality of the JCPC decisions is an important part of its credibility and not seriously questioned in the 
literature. New states which have not yet established an independent reputation for impartial 
adjudication can benefit from the right to appeal to the JCPC as it increases the credibility of their 
policy preferences (Voigt, Ebeling, & Blume, 2007). Additionally, for some of the new states, 
continued affiliation with the JCPC confers some degree of legitimacy on their judicial system. The 
statement by the then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore illustrates that the retention of the 
JCPC is a sign to the world of a commitment to judicial independence exemplifies this (Seow, 1997; 
Tan, 2015). The former President of The Bahamian Bar Association, Ruth Bowe Darville, also supports 
the retention of the JCPC (Rolle, 2012), pointing out that those who advocate for its removal are 
“treading in very dangerous waters”, as “litigants who come before us with multi‐million dollar cases 
and they see us as a great financial centre, they need assurance that the Privy Council [JCPC] is there” 
(Mohr, 2011, p. 126). 
The JCPC, therefore, has a long and prominent role in the judicial development of colonies and many 
sovereign states. The states that retained ties vary in size, population, socioeconomic conditions and 
geographic location. While the JCPC decisions establish precedents for those states, its decisions 
continue to be of assistance in the development of the jurisprudence of states that have severed ties 
(Gleeson, 2008). The persuasive value of JCPC decisions is recognized throughout the British 
Commonwealth and may even have similar authority on courts in England (Wilkie, 2016), 
underscoring the strong hold of the colonial legacy.  
The case studies on New Zealand and The Gambia illustrate the struggles some countries go through to 
eventually sever ties with the JCPC. In the case of The Gambia, it took the adoption of a new 
constitution following a coup d’état and repressive military rule that damaged the country’s human 
rights record. The regime was uncertain that the decisions of the domestic courts would be upheld by 
the JCPC. Officially, appeals to this vestige of colonialism was an affront to state sovereignty, and with 
the post-coup d’état constitution, the right of appeal was removed. Constitutional changes that excluded 
the right to appeal to the JCPC was also the case in other former colonies including Nigeria, Tanzania, 
Sierra Leone, Uganda, Kenya and India, which followed very quickly after independence. The change 
in New Zealand did not occur after paradigm shift in governance following a coup d’état but a change 
of political party ushering in a new direction for the state which found the JCPC incompatible with the 
vision. Further, like former colonies including Canada, Malaysia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka, breaking 
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the judicial tie with the former colonial power occurred many years after independence without a 
paradigm shift like a coup d’état. 
As of 2019, 12 former colonies retain the JCPC. The highest concentration is eight Commonwealth 
Caribbean states which have retained the JCPC as the final appellate court even with the Caribbean 
Court of Justice (CCJ) available under the Treaty of Chaguaramas (1973). So far, only Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, and Guyana have acceded to the CCJ. These states have replaced the JCPC with 
another court each has little direct control over. Ironically, while the court is in Port of Spain, Trinidad, 
that country along with the seven others, has yet to sever ties with the JCPC and accede to the CCJ. The 
phenomena of the CCJ with both original and appellate jurisdictions (much like the JCPC) developing 
within a framework of regional integration and the relationship of the states with the court needs further 
examination and provides fertile areas for future research. 
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Notes 
Note 1. Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Grenada, Jamaica, 
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the 
Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. 
Note 2. Anguilla, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, Cayman Islands, 
Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn Islands, St Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, 
South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, 
Turks and Caicos Islands, and Virgin Islands. 
Note 3. Not included are the 13 North American colonies that became the United States. They did not 
emerge as independent countries and independence in 1776 pre-dated the modern JCPC. 
Note 4. The 14 territories that are currently British colonies and dependencies are not included. 
 
